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1. Introduction 
Following renewed interest in institutions (North, 1990; Crawford and Ostrom 1995; Olson 2000, 
Roland 2000, Williamson 2000 and many others), a wide literature has emerged since the mid 1990 which 
tests the impact of institutional quality on macroeconomic performance. In summary, this literature suggests 
a positive causal relationship between institutional reform and economic performance at the macro level (for 
meta-analyses see: Babeckỳ and Campos 2011; Efendic et al., 2011). Reforms are assumed to reduce 
transaction costs, investment risk and enhance business opportunities, generating greater returns to private 
sector investment and innovation (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Dreher, Kotsogianis and McCorriston, 2007; 
Boerner and Hainz 2009). Based on this, developing and transition countries are urged to improve their 
institutions and national governance structures. The expectation is that domestic industries will benefit in 
the long run, which will translate into increased economic growth. However, there is relatively little micro 
level investigation of the perceived mechanisms linking reforms with firm behaviour and performance, less 
still that which examines the impacts on different types of firms. The large micro literature has essentially 
focussed only on the link between change of ownership status (including transfer to foreign investors) and 
firm performance during a phase of institutional reforms (see Estrin et al. 2009 for overview). Yet this takes 
changes in the institutional environment as given: far less has been done on linkages between institutional 
reforms, ownership structures and performance. We intend to address these shortcomings, by taking a more 
complete view of the issue, combining effects of firms’ ownership and market and institutional reforms in 
the analysis of firm performance. We highlight the importance of analyzing the differences both between 
firms and across countries, as well as the need to capture heterogeneity in the institutional environment. 
Following Krueger (1974), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2007) we 
argue that restricting competition will lead some dominant players, including foreign firms, to capture 
significant market shares and generate high price-cost margins. Adopting this perspective, our contribution 
can be described as follows.  
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Firstly, as noted by Syverson (2011) we still know very little about the impact of institutions on 
firms’ performance as the literature has been mostly silent on this. While our aim is to start filling this gap, 
we emphasise that in considering institutions, it is important not only to view institutional reforms as an 
aggregate concept, but also to analyse its multiple components separately, because each reform may have a 
different effect (Babeckỳ and Campos 2011); we need to understand how particular elements of reform 
matter for performance. Accordingly, we account for heterogeneity across countries and across time in   
investigating the extent to which ownership, in conjunction with various institutional reforms explain both 
firm’s productivity and profitability.  
Secondly, having a large firm-level cross-country panel dataset, comprising of foreign, domestic and 
state-owned firms, we are able to control for location decisions of internationally mobile firms. 
Accordingly, we strengthen the existing literature methodologically by allowing for the sample selection 
effect. In particular, we argue that foreign ownership should not, as has been the case in much of the 
literature, merely be treated as an exogenous event. In the context of a study of institutional reform and 
performance, foreign direct investment (FDI) becomes an endogenous event. 
Thirdly, apart from studies on regulated industries that seek to distinguish directly between 
efficiency-enhancing and rent-increasing effects (Saal and Parker, 2001; De Witte and Saal, 2010), much of 
the literature (perhaps rather erroneously) sees productivity and profitability as closely related. However, 
the distinction between productivity and profitability is an important one; Grifel-Tatje and Lovell (1999) 
highlight the key differences between measures of productivity and profitability. This distinction is also 
discussed in a number of contexts related to our research question. For example, Girma et al. (2006) argue 
that productivity refers to the returns achieved by internal stakeholders, namely that increases in 
productivity boost discretionary resources potentially available to both the internal stakeholders (‘the 
insiders’) and the external stakeholders (in particular the shareholders and tax collectors). In contrast, profits 
represent only those returns that are available to external shareholders after internal stakeholders have taken 
their return. In particular, the shareholders benefit both directly from profits distributed as dividends and 
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indirectly from retained profits that may increase the firm’s net present value. We build on Girma et al. 
(2006), but also explain some limitations of their approach below. 
Our dataset consists of a sample of 60,078 firms from 12 Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, controlling for selectivity bias in ownership and analysing more closely the differential impact of 
various components of reforms. The countries we consider have all engaged in large scale institutional 
reform, but to different extents, albeit from a similar starting point. Thus, the CEE countries correspond to 
the ‘natural experiment setting’ (Eicher and Schreiber, 2010) as far as institutional reforms are concerned.1 
The key intuition we wish to investigate empirically is that without reforms, incumbent firms realise 
high rents, resulting from obstacles to competition, which also leads to lower firm productivity (Krueger 
1974; Ades and Di Tella 1999). We extend this line of research, by linking the institutional literature to that 
on effects of firm ownership. In particular, we posit that reforms may increase internal efficiency via 
enhancing the pressure of competition, facilitating access to new resources that come with lower transaction 
costs, and lowering agency costs, yet at the same time they may have an adverse effect on profitability. To 
the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to focus on these competing effects of institutional reform, 
across different types of firms. 
In the next section we discuss our prior knowledge. Section 3 deals with sample and methods. 
Section 4 is on empirical results. We present conclusions in Section 5. 
 
                                                 
1
 “The fall of the Iron Curtain provides a unique controlled, or natural, experiment in that the initial institutional change is clearly 
exogenous, which potentially mitigates the endogeneity bias. It also provides a unique opportunity to analyze the impact of 
subsequent structural policy changes /…/ in a sizeable number of countries, with similar initial conditions, over the same period 
of time.” (Eicher and Schreiber, 2010, p. 169) 
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2. Institutional reforms, ownership and performance 
2.1. Ownership 
While we are mostly interested in how the interaction between macro level institutional reforms and 
micro level ownership structures affect performance (see below), in this section we briefly discuss potential 
ownership effects on performance that may be independent from institutional variation (at least in the 
observed range of the latter).  
Firstly, one strand of the literature explores whether acquisition by a foreign owned firm leads to 
productivity growth (Conyon et al., 2002; Harris and Robinson, 2002). The underlying assumption here is 
that foreign firms have some form of firm specific advantage, be it technical or managerial. When a host 
country firm is acquired by an inward investor, this knowledge or technology becomes available to the 
former, and productivity increases. This literature has expanded into analysis of ownership change in 
emerging and transition economies: the gains associated with resource transfers may be particularly 
significant in such environments (see Estrin et al., 2009 for a review). Thus, foreign owned firms may 
perform best in transition economies due to both imported quality of governance and better resource 
endowments along other dimensions (e.g. management techniques, knowledge of global markets, access to 
finance, technological know-how). 
Secondly, agency problems may be particularly severe in firms which are under state ownership, 
which leads to difficulty in effective monitoring and in lower performance. In the state-owned firms, neither 
managers have rights to residual value that would result in strong incentives, nor is there pressure on 
performance coming from private shareholders. Monitoring chains become long and obscure, stretching 
from state-owned firm managers to public administrators, politicians and finally, the general public. 
Accordingly, we posit that foreign firms outperform domestic private firms, which in turn perform 
better than state-owned firms, when comparing productivity measures, which can be viewed as an internal 
return to firms. In contrast, profitability differences may have a different pattern. We posit that once we 
move to profitability, it becomes difficult to assess how the latter is affected by ownership in isolation from 
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market conditions and the institutional environments shaping the nature of potential politically generated 
rents. Thus, while we expect a definite ordering in terms of productivity comparisons between foreign 
domestic and state owned firms, this ordering breaks down in case of profitability. In particular, we expect 
the differential effects of reforms on internal and external stakeholders, across different types of firms, 
which we discuss next. 
 
2.2. Institutional Reforms 
Amongst others, North (1990), Williamson (2000), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Jellema and 
Roland (2011), Estrin et al. (2012) emphasise the critical importance of secure property rights based on 
effective constitutional structure that ensures balances and limits of political power. This matters for 
development, investment and performance. Yet, as both North (1990) and Williamson (2000) point out, 
these institutional features change rarely, so identifying their effects is challenging, unless one looks at very 
long term phenomena. What we are left with in a short run is the “lower level” institutional features; namely 
the regulatory environment. These regulatory elements are broadly framed by ‘higher order’ constitutional 
frameworks. Yet there is sufficient heterogeneity and variation in regulation across countries and over time, 
even in countries with similar ‘deeper level’ constitutional features, to justify questions concerning the 
short-term links between regulatory environment and performance outcomes. We aim to fill this gap.  
From the technical, but not necessarily from the political economy, point of view (see Roland, 2000) 
regulatory reforms can be implemented relatively quickly. Yet, would we expect them to bring immediate 
and wide-ranging effects on the behaviour of firms? 
Campos and Horváth (2012) in the context of macro growth determinants distinguish between three 
areas of regulatory reforms: (i) internal liberalisation, (ii) external liberalisation, and (iii) privatisation. The 
first two aim to establish basic conditions of market competition, both for existing and new businesses and 
via integration with world markets, consistent with the theory inherited from Tullock (1967), Krueger 
(1974) and Bhagwati (1982). In turn, privatisation ensures that there is enough diversity between the 
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economic agents to make this competition meaningful. This is in contrast to an economy dominated by 
state-owned firms, where it is less obvious where the actual competition could come from. Also, unlike the 
direct ownership effects we sketched out above, here the privatisation effects are the environmental 
(ecological) effects, assumed to influence firms regardless of their own ownership status. 
We argue however that these three clusters of reforms need to be supplemented by two key areas: 
(iv) regulation of entry and (v) finance. Emphasis on the former can be traced back to the seminal paper by 
Djankov et al. (2002). Their key intuition relates to the fact that the effective competition comes primarily 
from the new ventures, enhancing performance, thus emphasising the significance of low formal entry 
barriers. In turn, access to finance affects how fast the new ventures (and any other ventures with high-value 
adding projects) can turn their plans into practice. Accordingly, an underdeveloped financial sector hampers 
economic growth and performance, also on micro level; as Coricelli et al. (forthcoming) posit, market 
reforms improve the monitoring of indebted firms by financiers, thus reducing excessive lending, and 
encouraging productivity growth (see also Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). In turn, the quality of 
the financial sector links directly to the quality of regulation (Barth et al., 2008). 
While there is a broad literature relating some of these reforms to economic growth (see Falcetti et 
al., 2002; Falcetti et al., 2006, Campos and Horváth, 2012; and meta-analyses by Babeckỳ and Campos, 
2011; Efendic et al., 2011), less is known about their impact at the micro level. We expect the liberalization 
and regulatory reform measures outlined above to have a positive effect on productivity; in contrast, the 
impact of reforms on firm profitability may be more ambiguous. For some firms, liberalization may 
stimulate efficiency gains and scale effects related to access to wider markets, creating temporary, dynamic 
quasi-rents that feed through to profitability gains.  At the same time however, competition increases and 
while firms generate productivity growth, they may experience a decline in monopoly rents. Ades and Di 
Tella (1999) point to how the ability of incumbent firms to collude with corrupt officials, can result in high 
pre-reform rents. Liberalization may eliminate this advantage and therefore reduce the profitability of 
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incumbents, while benefiting new entrants. Accordingly, the relationship between institutional reform and 
firm financial performance is more complex. 
Thus, consistent with Girma et al. (2006) discussed above, the impact on internal and external 
returns may differ. Further, Driffield and Du (2007) examine the relationship between performance change 
and ownership change in the context of privatisation in China. They demonstrate that foreign acquisition has 
a significant impact on productivity, but a smaller effect on profitability. Reforms may therefore increase 
internal efficiency via enhancing the pressure of competition, facilitating access to new resources that come 
with lower transaction and agency costs, yet at the same time they may have an adverse effect on 
profitability. 
Furthermore, it is clear that where institutions fail to protect minority or outside shareholders, 
productivity and profitability are likely to diverge (Driffield and Du, 2007). Moreover, these effects will 
differ for alternative ownership structures. As argued above, the governance structures are likely to be 
weakest in state-owned firms, and strongest in foreign-owned firms. Further, government intervention may 
be rather uneven in the presence of weak institutions, which may lead some firms to succeed not via 
efficiency or good strategy, but by special, politically-generated gains. Higher profitability may result from 
political rents and state capture by specific categories of owners (Hellman 1998; Hellman et al. 2002, 2003; 
Slinko et al. 2005; Havrylyshyn, 2006; Mickiewicz, 2009). We expect therefore that the impact of 
institutional reform on profitability is more varied compared with its impact on productivity, depending on 
the nature of the reform and the type of firm concerned.  
 
2.3. Differential effects of reforms on foreign firms 
The evidence on the impact of institutions on FDI is ambiguous (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). Whereas 
most studies find an inverse relationship, some have even shown a positive impact of weak institutions on 
FDI, as for example, Egger and Winner (2005). One possible reason for these contradictory results may be 
that as much of the analysis focuses on investment flows at the country level, it sheds little light on the 
9 
 
motivation of firms to engage in FDI in a given location. Notable exceptions that are not confined to the 
aggregate level are Javorcik and Wei (2009) and Driffield et al. (2010) who, while pointing out that 
institutions impact on the firm’s decision to undertake FDI, argue that the relationship is far from simple. 
And the more subtle reason for the ambiguity in reported results may be that foreign companies could 
actually take advantage of weak institutions, which can be reasoned as follows: in many middle and low 
income countries with dysfunctional institutions, large foreign investors are sheltered from the negative 
impact of the business environment by operating in enclaves protected by relational capital with the host 
country government. Examples of such a situation relate to resource-rich economies, where large rents are 
shared with foreign investors, based on government privilege instead of the rule of law.
2
 
A different line of argument is that foreign companies’ productivity may also be driven to some 
extent by the international scale of their operations, therefore remaining less sensitive to local conditions 
compared to private domestic firms. Combining all of the arguments, we argue that institutional reforms 
will have smaller positive impact on foreign companies’ productivity compared with domestic and state-
owned firms. In contrast, the reforms may have a negative differential effect on profitability with respect to 
foreign-owned companies to the extent that the pre-reform profitability was driven by privilege. 
 
2.4. Differential effects of reforms on state owned firms  
With the dismantling of the communist apparatus of surveillance and centralised administration, the 
government was unable to exert any effective ownership control on thousands of state-owned firms, which 
led to insider control of firm operations. Accordingly, a strand of theory that has been applied to CEE 
countries models state-owned firms as controlled by insiders, such as labour in particular (Aghion and 
Blanchard 1994, 1998; Mickiewicz 1996; Filatotchev et al. 1999). Due to lack of property rights, those who 
control the firms cannot separate distributional decisions from optimisation decisions, which affects 
                                                 
2
 For example, Azerbaijan scores very low on institutional quality measures, but creates relatively good business conditions for 
foreign investors within the oil sector. 
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performance. In particular, it will only be by coincidence that the labour-controlled firms set the 
employment level at the value that maximises productivity. Typically it will either be too large (in case 
where a private owner would rather shed employment in need to restructure) or too small (when insiders 
may restrict employment growth to maximise internal rents per employee). In both cases, employment will 
be chosen at a sub-optimal level. This perspective implies that the framework adopted by Girma et al. 
(2006) (see section 2.2 above) may be too simple, as it assumes – in a Coasian spirit - that allocational 
decisions within firms (affecting internal performance) may be easily separated from distributional 
decisions (affecting external performance). 
Moreover, it is in the state sector, where opportunities for ‘political capitalism’ are most likely to 
emerge. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) discuss bargaining between politicians and state-owned firms in order 
to realise mutual special interests at the cost of economic efficiency. They argue that this type of bargaining 
is more likely to succeed in the case of state-owned firms than between politicians and private owners, as it 
is less costly to compensate the managers of state-owned firms for the adoption of politically motivated 
objectives for their operations. Indeed, they do not need to be compensated for the opportunity cost of lower 
returns. This is a different channel, resulting in lower (internal) firm productivity.  Yet, parallel to insiders’ 
control effects, the (implicit) contracts between the politicians and state-owned firms may typically imply 
effects related to the size of employment and remuneration of labour, as jointly captured by the ratio of the 
total wage bill to value added (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; for empirical evidence, see also: Frydman et al., 
1999; La Porta and Lópes-de-Silanes, 1999). The point we emphasise however is that opportunities for such 
outcomes diminish with institutional reform. 
The political economy perspective represented by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) is akin but not 
identical to the theory of soft budget constraints (Kornai et al., 2003). Here, the government is not assumed 
as driven by its private benefits. A benevolent government may still not be able to eliminate inefficiency, if 
the informational asymmetries vis-à-vis the state-owned firms are particularly severe. The soft budget 
constraint describes a situation, where the government would like to enforce better performance, but the 
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managers of state-owned firms behave opportunistically and the outcomes of their actions are only observed 
with delay. Once the performance data is revealed, the government may choose to subsidise the firms, as 
bankruptcy of a state-owned firm comes with negative utility to politicians (which may reflect their private 
welfare function but may also represent social welfare, or a combination of these two). Thus, the 
government faces a problem of post-contractual opportunism, which is akin to moral hazard. This creates 
the soft budget situation generating disincentives to perform. Yet, institutional reforms may alleviate the 
problem, both by diminishing informational asymmetries between the government and the firms, and by 
creating credible commitment to non-subsidisation (by imposing credible rules that restrict opportunities for 
arbitrary public assistance).  
These two perspectives (political corruption and soft budget) may be complementary and not 
mutually exclusive and should be placed in the context of institutional change. With competition-enhancing 
market reforms and withdrawal of government support, the state-owned firms face stronger incentives to 
enhance their productivity to protect themselves against external shocks and the risk of bankruptcy. That 
makes the predicted effect of reforms on internal productivity positive and unambiguous.  
In contrast, the effects on profitability may be subject to conflicting influences. Some of enhanced 
internal productivity will be transformed into higher profitability. On the other hand, it is the loss of 
government support, especially in terms of protecting incumbents from competition, preferential credit, and 
direct subsidies, which is likely to negatively affect profitability. We expect this second cluster of effects to 
dominate. 
In between these two ownership categories (foreign versus state-owned), we find firms controlled by 
domestic private owners. In contrast to foreign owners, private domestic owners from transition countries 
are less likely to be exposed to global markets and to efficiency-enhancing opportunities and pressures. 
Therefore, economic reform (liberalization) is likely to have a stronger positive impact on their internal 
performance compared with the case of foreign firms, but still weaker than in the case of state-owned firms 
– private domestic companies are less likely to be involved in political exchange with the government 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) and soft budgeting (Kornai et al., 2003) of private domestic firms has been far 
less prevalent than in the case of the state sector.  It follows therefore that there is also less scope for 
efficiency improvement in the case of private domestic firms. 
 
2.5. Hypotheses 
To summarize, we present our prior knowledge about the impact of reforms and ownership on both 
internal performance (productivity) and external performance (profits) as hypotheses in Table 1 below. We 
expect that there is a hierarchy in terms of productivity, with the mean productivity effect for foreign 
ownership to be highest, and for state ownership to be lowest. We also expect the reforms to impact 
productivity in a positive way, yet these effects to be strongest for state companies and weakest for foreign 
companies. In contrast, with respect to profitability, we expect that the reforms to have the strongest 
positive effect on domestic companies, weaker positive (or even negative) on foreign firms, and negative on 
state owned firms. 
 
{Insert Table 1 about here} 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. The sample scope: general comments 
The range of firms we include is much wider than the large publicly quoted companies; focus on the 
latter while important would generate a biased sample. Stock markets may not correspond to the nationwide 
institutional frameworks within which most of firms, including large ones, operate (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Equally, while large firms dominate most sectors, they are not representative of a typical way that the 
institutional framework impacts on firms’ behaviour and performance. Further, consistent with what we 
discussed above, in many transition economies, large firms may easily form some relational network capital 
with politicians and administrators that insulate them from negative effects of weak institutional quality 
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within the country, but - as another aspect of the same phenomena - may also lead to state capture and 
creation and maintenance of firm-specific rents (Hellman et al., 2003). This motivates our focus on a large 
spectrum of firms in our empirical design.  
Furthermore, we not only broaden the range of firms we consider, but we also benefit from our 
choice of cross-country variation. We focus on the post-Soviet ‘transition’ region of CEE that offers 
dramatic institutional variation, and also provides an interesting natural experiment setting. In particular, the 
initial institutional setup was very similar in this group of countries at the time when the reforms started 
(1989-1991), and that makes it a robust set of economies to compare. The institutional differences in CEE 
after two decades of reforms has resulted from alternative policy choices; thus, there is a relatively smaller 
risk that the variation in institutions captures some omitted country-level conditions related to institutions. 
Indeed, in the initial point, those economies were more homogeneous compared with other parts of the 
world.  
    
3.2. Data and performance measures: details 
We utilise a large database of European firms drawn from Amadeus which is a comprehensive and 
rich firm-level dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk, a leading electronic publisher of annual account 
information on private and public firms. Compiling the information on firms operating in 12 CEE host 
countries produces a large data-set spanning the period 1998-2006. Our sample of host countries consists of 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia and Ukraine.
3
 Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of firms across the sample countries and 
                                                 
3
 We did not include countries where we would had less than 5 firms (e.g. Macedonia, Moldova etc.). The smallest country in our 
sample has at least 100 firms at some point in the panel period. Further, given that our focus is on performance, we noticed some 
of the observations on our outcome/performance measures, profitability in particular, were not in plausible range. Responding to 
this, we cleaned the data with respect to severe outliers, i.e. observations where (1) the ratio of EBIT to total assets lies outside the 
outer fence defined by the inter-quartile range multiplied by three, corresponding to a range of -0.5 and 0.7 (2) likewise for log of 
total factor productivity (the outer fence: either below -0.7 or above 5). We also verified that using an alternative simpler method 
of removing one percentile from each end of the distribution of our dependent variables made our results stronger on average, 
compared with using inter-quartile range as in the results we report. 
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ownership types. We included all firms for which we had at least one year worth of information on the 
variables of interest.  
 
{Insert Table 2 about here} 
  
 There is a wide range of home countries in our sample. The list is dominated by foreign investors 
from the US and also the old EU countries including France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK, Denmark 
and Sweden. In addition, there are also foreign investors from other OECD (e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan), 
newly emerging (e.g., Brazil, China, India and Russia) as well as those from the Middle-East countries (e.g., 
Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey). More detailed data on distribution of home countries is available on 
request. 
 
3.3. Dependent variables 
 We aim to explore differences between total factor productivity (TFP) and profitability as indicators 
of performance and argue that they measure related but distinctive phenomena. These two measures are our 
dependent variables. To quantify the profitability of a firm (external performance), we use the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, which proxies for the return on assets. This is a standard 
indicator which shows the return on investment undertaken. Internal performance is proxied by an estimate 
of total factor productivity (TFP) derived as the residual of the production function using the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) semi-parametric approach. It has now become a standard technique to address the problem of 
endogeneity in the applied microeconomic literature that uses firm-level data to estimate TFP (further detail 
in section 3.6).  
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3.4. Independent variables: reform indicators 
 We use the set of institutional measures developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD, 1995-2009) which has been commonly used by researchers. EBRD clusters three 
liberalization measures together, labelling them ‘first stage reforms’. These include (i) internal price 
liberalization, (ii) liberalization of foreign trade and exchange rate and (iii) freedom of entry, where the 
latter is also associated with small scale privatisation that is with privatisation of small enterprises, typically 
in services. However, we side with Campos and Horváth (2012) who argue that the EBRD grouping is not 
ideal. It is important to disentangle the three components of liberalisation as these can be implemented 
separately and with different effects on performance. In fact, these three reforms did not follow the same 
path: when we examined it for our data, it came with a relatively low Cronbach Alpha of 0.63. 
 In contrast, five additional elements are considered by EBRD as ‘second stage’ reforms that need 
more time for implementation.  Unlike liberalisation they require institution building rather than removal of 
barriers. This encompasses privatisation of large enterprises (which may also imply introducing related legal 
frameworks)
4
, and three aspects of financial reforms (banks, non-banking finance, and corporate 
governance) plus competition policy.  
 Our awareness of imperfect measurement of reforms led us to draw from alternative institutional 
measures offered by the Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal indicators of Economic Freedom, to 
investigate robustness of our results.
5
 While EBRD measures are declared as taking the regulatory standards 
observed in developed market economies as the benchmark, the Economic Freedom indicators simply range 
                                                 
4
 We doubt if a (‘large scale’) privatisation process should be considered as a ‘second stage’ reform: it was often implemented 
fast, especially when ‘mass privatisation’ methods were used (that is methods based on vouchers-based privatisations, 
privatisations to insiders or a combination of both). Moreover, existing evidence documents some immediate direct effects of 
privatisation on firm performance (see overview of evidence by: Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Estrin 
et al., 2009). It is also likely that the environmental, i.e. indirect effects are rapid: where its competitors change ownership status, 
a company faces a tougher challenge (from privatised companies). And this effect is independent to the one that follows from a 
change in its own ownership status. We argue therefore that the scale of privatisation in a country could be considered alongside 
liberalisation elements as one of the reforms that may impact on an individual firm performance rapidly. 
5
 See Aidis et al. (2012) for more extensive discussion of the ‘Economic Freedom’ indicators. 
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from more to less regulation.
6
 Despite this significant difference in underlying political philosophy, in the 
relevant range, the two measures are relatively well correlated.  
 Mapping EBRD indicators onto Economic Freedom to produce a reasonable match is in some cases 
easy yet in other cases next to impossible.
7
 First, the EBRD external liberalisation measure is akin to ‘trade 
freedom’ but also to ‘investment freedom’ as the latter covers foreign exchange and foreign investment 
restrictions or their absence. Second, while EBRD has a separate price liberalisation measure, the Heritage 
dataset includes it in ‘monetary freedom’ indicator, combining it with the level of inflation. A justification 
of this approach is that open price inflation becomes a problematic indicator, where prices are controlled, 
yet high open inflation with no price control, and low inflation with significant price controls are two 
distinctively different cases, while they may produce a similar ranking on ‘monetary freedom’. Thus, we 
simply do not have an alternative measure for price liberalisation. Third, the situation is better with respect 
to entry regulation. Here, the EBRD measure of freedom of entry and small scale liberalisation can be 
matched with Business Freedom, which is simply an indicator that aggregates the World Bank ‘Doing 
Business’ enterprise survey components related to direct entry barriers, licencing barriers and exit barriers. 
Fourth, for EBRD’s ‘large scale privatisation’ indicator, there is no matching measure in the Economic 
Freedom dataset. There is a measure of the overall size of government spending, but it is not the same thing. 
Finally, with respect to the financial regulation measures, the EBRD offers three indicators: (i) banking 
reforms, (ii) non-banking finance and stock exchange, (iii) governance and restructuring, where the latter 
features quality of corporate governance frameworks. For our data, all these three EBRD indicators can be 
credibly combined into one scale (Cronbach Alpha: 0.90). In turn, Heritage/Wall Street Journal produces 
one Financial Freedom indicator, which is a relatively good match to the scale we produced based on the 
EBRD financial measures. 
                                                 
6
 With some important exceptions. For example, with respect to “financial freedom” some (low) threshold of sound financial 
regulation is assumed as a benchmark, not lack of any regulation. 
7
 For lack of space we do not offer a detailed description of each of those two sets of indicators. These are available at 
<<http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/macro.shtml>> and 
<<http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology>>. 
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 We also produced our own liberalisation scale, which combines relevant EBRD indicators and 
Economic Freedom indicators and seems empirically coherent for our data. It combines EBRD Price 
Liberalisation, External Liberalisation and Freedom of Entry with Trade Freedom and Monetary Freedom 
from Heritage; the resulting scale is based on standardized items, as both set of indicators use different 
measurement units (Cronbach Alpha: 0.82). As indicated above, Heritage’s Monetary Freedom indicator 
mixes inflation and price control, so is problematic when used separately, but contributes to this new scale 
well, correlating with other dimensions. 
 
3.5. Control variables 
We include a host of additional factors which may affect firm performance. First, in order to control 
for firm size and to account for nonlinearities in the relationship between size and productivity, we group 
enterprises into small, medium and large categories according to their assets. It is important to control for 
size, as the likelihood of extracting some political rents relates not only to ownership status but also to a 
bargaining position as determined by the size of the firm. In addition, we may have some economies and 
diseconomies of scale affecting productivity. Use of size categories instead of a continuous variable comes 
at cost of precision of estimates, but alleviates the simultaneity bias between short-term variation in 
performance and size.  
Second, we control for market share. We introduce a logarithm of market share estimated against all 
other firms in a given sector. This captures the effect that can be purely attributed to market position.  
Third, we control for the technology intensity of a firm. We introduce a dummy that identifies high-
technology firms, applying the OECD/Eurostat definition. 
As our main hypotheses relate to macro level measures of reforms, we also need to control for 
alternative macro level influences. We introduce the level of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity, 
constant US dollars) to control for the overall level of development. In turn, by using annual GDP growth 
rates we control for general business opportunities, which may not necessary be related to the advance in 
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reforms. Similarly, we distinguish between more and less open economies by controlling for the ratios of 
both imports and exports to GDP. Those measures of openness may be correlated with reforms, but may 
also be driven by other factors such as size of the economy, with smaller countries likely to be more open. 
We also included full sets of industry, country and time dummies to control for industry-specific, country-
specific and time-specific factors that may affect firm performance.  
 
3.6 Estimation Strategy  
We estimate productivity (TFP) derived as the residual of the production function using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semi-parametric approach which is an econometric technique to address 
endogeneity in inputs. This particular endogeneity problem occurs when at least a part of the TFP (e.g. 
productivity shock) is unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the firm at a time early enough so 
as to change the factor input decision. If that is the case, then profit maximization implies that the 
realization of the error term is expected to influence the decision on factor inputs. That makes ordinary least 
squares estimation biased and inconsistent. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that by using material inputs 
as a proxy to control for unobservable productivity shocks can alleviate the endogeneity of inputs in a 
production function setting
8
. 
Theoretically, any firm in our sample can attract foreign investment and thus have a foreign 
ownership share. However, in practical terms the probability of acquisition by a foreign firm is a non-
random event. We control for this potential selection bias by initially estimating the probability of firm 
attracting foreign ownership, and subsequently employ an estimator based on Wooldridge (1995) to allow 
for the selection issue. This is essentially an extension of the Heckman (1979) model that has been widely 
used in this area (Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina, 2007). The essential premise is that if one seeks to 
link FDI to performance then one has to first control for selectivity bias in the sample of firms that have 
                                                 
8
 This technique is widely used in the literature on firm performance. The full description of this estimation and algorithm is 
omitted due to space constraints. Readers interested in more detail are referred to the original work by Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003).  
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some foreign ownership. The method proposed by Wooldridge (1995) has the added advantage in that it not 
only corrects for selection bias (as in Heckman, 1979), but also control for the unobserved heterogeneity as 
in a standard fixed effects model. Further, it allows for unbalanced panels; the residual correlation property 
of this kind of model is not affected by a potential survivor bias. 
This is a two stage estimation procedure to control for the non-random nature of foreign ownership. 
The first step essentially includes year-by-year probits where the dependent variable is binary (i.e. 1 if the 
firm has some degree of foreign ownership and 0 otherwise) and a number of main determinants which are 
common in the literature on multinationality (e.g. productivity, firm-size, intangible assets, industry 
affiliation).
9
 In the second stage of the estimation we then include the information obtained from the first 
step (inverse Mills ratios) to control for selection bias as well as a full set of country and year fixed effects 
to alleviate a possibility that our institutional effects are driven by some unobserved heterogeneity or by 
common time-specific shocks. 
In addition we added random country-year effects to our second stage. In case of each of our 
specifications we tested a hypothesis if the residual inter-cluster (country-year) variation plays a significant 
role. The tests suggested that the random effects were needed. Either adding random effects or at least 
clustering standard errors is important to avoid artificially suppressing standard errors for our institutional 
(that is country level) variables, which would be easy to achieve given a large sample size.  
Finally, we mean centred all our institutional measures. As we use interactions of institutions and 
ownership, this allows us to interpret the coefficients of ownership dummies as captured at mean values of 
institutional range.
10
 
 
                                                 
9
 What is crucial for this procedure is to include a variable which affects the amount of foreign investment but not firm 
performance directly (exclusion criteria). In this paper we use free cash that a firm has at its disposal, this being strongly 
correlated with the likelihood of attracting investment, but uncorrelated with performance (Jensen 1986; Barkema and Vermeulen 
1998). 
10
 Strictly speaking, we centred the institutional indicators on the feasible values of the indices closest to their means. 
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4. Results 
All our results are presented in two sets, where in each case the first one relates to estimates of 
internal performance (TFP) and the second one to estimates of external performance (return on assets). With 
ownership measures, the omitted benchmark category is always ‘private domestic’ dominant owners. 
Table 3 (models (1)-(6) documents first the tests based on the individual liberalization dimensions as 
discussed above, where indicators are taken both from the EBRD and the Heritage databases. The last 
column (7) reports the results using a liberalisation scale we constructed combining standardized items from 
both sources (external liberalization, price liberalization, freedom of entry from EBRD, trade freedom and 
monetary freedom from Heritage).  
In Table 4 we present estimations of productivity that use the scale we constructed combining three 
EBRD financial measures (spec. 8), financial freedom (spec. 9), and next EBRD (‘large scale’) privatisation 
measure (model 10), and finally ‘competition policy’ (11), which is the final EBRD measure not used 
earlier. Next, we additionally show results when measuring the overall impact of reforms by using the 
average of all eight EBRD sub-indices (model (12) in Table 4) and the average of all individual dimensions 
used by Heritage, that is, the Economic Freedom indicator (model 13). 
In all models we include dominant ownership dummies, reform indicators, and interactive terms 
between the institutional indicators and ownership. Table 5 and 6 mirror all these specifications for 
estimates on profitability. 
 
{Insert Table 3-6 about here} 
 
As judged by coefficients of ownership dummies in all models presented in tables 3-4, the basic 
order of productivity is consistent with the literature on privatisation effects in transition economies (Estrin 
et al., 2009; Djankov and Murrell, 2002) and with our hypotheses H1a and H1b. At mean values of 
institutional indicators, across all the specifications, foreign-owned firms demonstrate superior performance 
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as compared with domestic private firm, which in turn dominate state-owned firms. The differences in this 
ordering are significant. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effects of the components of liberalisation measures on 
productivity. The positive effects of both price liberalisation (spec. (4)) and of external liberalisation (spec. 
(1)) stand apart as the most significant ones. In addition, our new composite market liberalization scale has 
strong positive impact on performance (i.e. model (7) in table 3). In turn, table 4 shows estimates for the 
impact of regulatory reforms other than liberalisation (i.e. ‘second stage’ reforms). In contrast to the 
estimates for first stage liberalisation measures, it is more difficult to detect a short-term positive effect, 
apart from an important exception of financial reform when measured by the scale we constructed based on 
EBRD indicators (specification (8) in table 4). Yet when financial freedom indicator is used, the result 
becomes (weakly) negative. Likewise, competition policy comes with weak negative effect on performance, 
and so does large scale privatisation: it does not increase performance. Note that we are measuring an 
environmental effect, in addition to positive individual firm ownership effect, which remains highly 
significant for both categories of private ownership. Finally, we detect some catch-all short-run positive 
effect of EBRD composite measure of reforms on productivity (i.e. model (12)). But this result is much 
weaker than that obtained when we use more disaggregated measures of liberalisation. Thus, Hypothesis H2 
is supported when based on liberalisation measures, however the results are more ambiguous with respect to 
regulatory (“second stage”) indicators. 
We found the reforms to have differential impact on alternative ownership categories, as expected.  
In particular, the positive impact of aggregate reforms on state-owned firm productivity is always 
significantly stronger than that on the private firms, supporting H4a. This result is remarkably strong: it 
holds across all interaction of state ownership with reform indicators for all the specifications (1)-(14). In 
contrast and equally consistently, the impact of reforms on productivity of foreign owned companies is 
always significantly weaker, as illustrated by the corresponding interactions in all the specifications, 
consistent with H3a.  
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It is interesting however to compare the effects of the two liberalisation variables, trade liberalisation 
and price liberalisation.  Figure 1 illustrates the adjusted mean effects based on specification 4 (for price 
liberalisation). The three points on the vertical axis of Figure 1 represent the values of the EBRD index of 
price liberalisation approximately one standard deviation from the sample mean each way (i.e. correspond 
to the values of the EBRD index at: 3.67, 4.00, 4.33). According to EBRD definition, a change between 
3.67 and 4.33 correspond to the removal of any state procurement at non-market prices and to removal of 
any price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies. The figure suggests, that moving two 
standard deviations along the reform index and achieving full price liberalisation (i.e. value of the index at 
4.33 compared with 3.67) increases average state firms productivity by 27%, while productivity of domestic 
private companies increases by 24% and that of foreign companies by 13%. As a result, the productivity 
gaps between all the ownership categories, but in particular between the state companies and others, narrow 
significantly under full liberalisation. All differences in response to price liberalisation between each pair of 
the ownership categories are significant. 
In turn, Figure 2 shows the differences in productivity associated with trade liberalisation. The mean 
value of the trade liberalisation indicator is lower and standard deviation higher, and correspondingly, we 
plot the EBRD indicator at values of 3.00, 3.33, 3.67, 4.00 and 4.33 (vertical axis of Figure 2). The upper 
limit corresponds to standards consistent with WTO membership; the lower limit to some quantitative 
import and export restrictions beyond agriculture, some significant export tariffs, major non-uniformity of 
tariffs for exports and imports, and/or direct involvement in exports and imports by ministries and other 
state-managed trade organisations. There are interesting differences between both figures. The impact on 
state companies is still stronger than on domestic and foreign companies, but the difference is not that large 
as for price liberalisation. And once we test the differences in productivity response to trade liberalisation 
between domestic private and foreign companies, the corresponding contrast is no longer significant, 
indicating that unlike H4a, support for H3a is sensitive to the choice of reform measures. Moving along the 
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EBRD index of trade liberalisation from 3.67 to 4.33, achieving full trade liberalisation, implies that state 
companies gain 18.0%, domestic private 13.7% and foreign companies 13.2% in terms of productivity.   
 
{Figures 1-2 around here} 
 
With respect to profitability (tables 5 and 6), we find consistently that, at the mean level of reforms, 
state companies and foreign companies are significantly less profitable than domestic private ones, with 
state companies being the least profitable. Yet, once we take account the interactions between reforms and 
ownership, a more interesting picture emerges. While the reforms consistently reduce profitability in the 
state sector the results being robust across all reform indicators, giving robust support to hypothesis H4b, 
individual reforms impact in different ways on the performance of multinational firms (H3b). The basic 
measures of both price liberalisation and trade liberalisation reduce rents achieved by foreign companies 
more than those by domestic private companies. However competition policy impacts less on MNEs than on 
domestic firms. The first result suggests that prior to reforms, MNEs enjoy certain advantages in terms of 
import restrictions and access to international goods and factor markets. The second result implies that some 
key monopolistic firms are more likely to remain in domestic hands. These differences are mirrored by the 
impacts of removal of entry barriers (as captured both by EBRD and by Business Freedom / World Bank 
‘Doing Business’ indicators), where the effect on foreign firms is lower, as foreign firms are less sensitive 
to emerging domestic competition. In parallel with this, the negative impact of financial reform on 
profitability is greater for domestic firms than foreign firms; the former seem to benefit to a greater degree 
from distortions in domestic credit markets. 
Again, we illustrate the scale of some of these effects utilising Figures 3-4. Profitability of state 
companies is at 9.5% (0.095) at the lower end of the range of price liberalisation we consider (EBRD index 
at 3.67), but that is cut by more than a half to 3.4% once full price liberalisation is achieved (Figure 3). 
Thus, while price liberalization has the strongest positive effect on productivity of state-owned firms, it has 
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also the strong relative negative effect on their profitability. This clearly suggests that (pre-reform) 
restrictions on price setting (especially related to factor markets) and the related issue of government 
procurement utilising non-market pricing imply rents that are realised primarily by the state sector. 
In turn, at the low level of price liberalisation foreign companies maintain a small advantage over 
domestic firms (11.2% versus 10.8%). This however is reversed once full price liberalisation is established 
(7.3% versus 10.6%): profitability enjoyed by foreign companies is eroded by almost exactly one third 
when full price liberalisation is implemented. Thus, while foreign companies maintain the productivity 
advantage regardless of reforms, liberalisation erodes the profitability advantage they enjoy significantly. 
In sharp contrast with the other two categories, profitability of domestic firms remains around 10.7% 
and a direct test of the effect of price liberalisation on domestic firms’ profitability suggests no effect. 
A different picture emerges once we concentrate on the impact of trade liberalisation on profitability 
(Figure 4). We verified that trade liberalisation has no significant impact on foreign firm’s profitability 
(based on testing of differential slope of trade liberalisation). In contrast, domestic companies gain 
significantly from internationalisation of the economy, while state companies are clearly losing some rents 
that were maintained by barriers to trade. The scale of these effects is again far from being trivial, as can be 
easily assessed from Figure 4.   
Finally, it is interesting to note some effects with respect to our control variables. Small firms are 
consistently more productive and more profitable than larger ones. This is consistent with many of our 
findings above, in that larger firms have stronger insiders, whose positions are protected by the lack of 
institutional quality, consistent with Girma et al. (2006). Unsurprisingly however, larger market share 
results in higher profitability, but also in higher productivity, consistent with both market power and 
efficiency, with high technology firms both more profitable and more productive, but only the former effect 
is consistently significant. 
Turning to macro effects, the level of development as represented by GDP per capita, which proxies 
for the quality of institutional environment and infrastructure other than that covered by reforms’ indicators, 
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comes across as highly significant for both productivity and profitability. In contrast, the impact of GDP 
growth is mostly insignificant, or marginally significant with unexpected negative sign. More clear-cut 
results relate to the measures of openness. Higher overall level of exports results in higher productivity 
indicating significant effects of broader markets and possibly spillover effects from exporters to other firms 
in the economy. In contrast, effects of imports on profitability are negative but not always significant. Both 
exports and imports affect profitability but do not affect productivity in any significant way. This is entirely 
in line with the theory we mentioned earlier on, including Krueger (1974), Ades and Di Tella (1999), 
Dreher, Kotsogiannis, McCorriston (2007). Yet, following the same literature, we focus more on 
institutional and policy environment, including external liberalisation, taking it as more exogenous. In 
contrast, the openness indictors reflect both some external conditions and the impact of policy decisions. 
 
4.1 Additional checks 
We run a series of robustness checks, testing alternative specifications. The battery of tests includes 
for example using the EBRD grouping of liberalisation, and combining the individual dimensions of the 
reforms in different specifications.
11
 Our findings are robust to these specifications.  
We also investigated how using Campos and Horváth (2012) indicators (internal reform, external 
reform, privatisation) affects the results. These are only available for 1997 to 2001, thus reducing 
significantly the inter-temporal variation in the indices. The results however remain robust, in that we find a 
positive impact of both internal reforms and external reforms on productivity, and weak negative 
environmental effect of privatisation. This is in line with the results discussed above. 
We also employed different measures of ownership, including ownership percentages rather than the 
measures of dominant ownership again with no substantial change in results.
12
 Next, with a small number of 
countries, we took the price liberalisation specification and run additional estimations omitting each country 
                                                 
11
 Even if the scale does not hold together for our data as indicated by low Cronbach Alpha. 
12
 We focus on ownership dummies in our results and discussion, as we did not develop any priors about the effects of changes of 
ownership shares; our discussion relates to the characteristics of the dominant owners. 
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observations in turn, both for productivity and for profitability measures. The results reported above are 
robust to these tests, although highlighting that the impact on foreign firms is strongest for Croatia, Estonia, 
Romania and Russia, as well as the earlier part of the sample (1996-1998) when the levels of foreign 
investment are significantly below the average for the full sample period. A similar exercise however 
reveals no differences across countries or time with respect to state firms. This is not surprising; as 
illustrated above, the results of price liberalisation on state sector are strongest, and therefore least affected 
by changes in the composition of the sample.  
Additional tests included  splitting the sample first by country and along time dimensions. However, 
with a relatively unbalanced data set, this reduces the extent to which we are able to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, as well as increasing the risk of outliers, or certain countries dominating. For the former 
Soviet Union (fSU) countries, results become less significant, while for other (Central European countries) 
they remain robust. However, this exercise does not  suggest that the results are weaker for one group of 
countries, but that the impact of reforms is non-linear: we estimate mean effects, and the mean values of 
reforms for the fSU countries are significantly lower. Thus, there may be some threshold levels of reforms, 
below which there is little impact. In addition, we split the sample for the period before the EU accession 
(1997-2003) of several countries in our sample, and after (2004-2006). The results in the first period remain 
strong, but in the more recent period are a little weaker. This may suggest that institutional variation 
decreases after the EU accession, making identification of effects more difficult. Yet it may also be affected 
by a short time span in the more recent period.  
Finally, for the whole sample, we compare ordinary least squares results with the more sophisticated 
estimators discussed above. Our results remain qualitatively similar, with the same inferences with respect 
to ordering of types of firms and the importance of the interactions between firm type and reforms.  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the links between institutional reforms and performance, using measures 
including liberalization of prices, of foreign trade and of entry into business, but also corporate governance 
and financial frameworks, privatisation in the environment and anti-trust regulatory structures. We compare 
the effects of improvements in these indices on firm performance and profitability. This is in contrast to the 
management literature, where the focus is on the financial performance. In particular, Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Dau (2009) find that market reforms contribute to external performance of publicly quoted companies in 
Latin America, and that the greatest effects are found for state-owned firms. Our results on a wide sample of 
firms from the transition economies of CEE confirm this finding, but also extend this analysis by looking at 
the relationships between institutions and performance, not merely in terms of profitability, but also 
productivity. We interpret this in the following way. 
Liberalisation generates productivity growth, but it does not affect all ownership sectors equally. 
The productivity advantage of foreign firms decreases slightly, and the state owned companies experience 
the most significant increase. This is perhaps not surprising, as liberalisation would be expected to benefit 
only firms that are in a position to take advantage of new opportunities, which may not be the existing 
market leaders, foreign firms in particular.  
At the same time, the productivity increase does not translate into profits growth overall. The clear 
cut effects relate to the profitability decreases for state owned firms as lack of reforms is associated with 
excessive rents for the state sector firms. For the foreign firms, the situation is more complex, as only some 
institutional reforms are associated with erosion of rents, as we discussed above. 
The results suggest that productivity of inward investment is a feature of the ownership advantages 
that are transferred from the parent, and thus are essentially less dependent on the institutional environment. 
At the same time, many inward investors are also dominant players in their industry, and so while they may 
claim that they want better institutions, it may also erode their first mover advantage. In particular, that 
relates to the fundamental dimension of price liberalisation. That is not to say that weak institutions don’t 
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deter FDI (an effect for which we controlled in the first stage of our estimation), but those foreign firms that 
we observe investing enjoy an advantage over other ownership sectors where prices are not liberalised 
and/or goods are purchased by the government using non-market prices. 
With respect to productivity, the strongest impacts of institutional reform are on the state-owned 
firms, suggesting that this is where internal returns grow fastest. We interpret this as evidence that reforms 
strongly improve internal performance of state-owned firms rather than their financial performance, 
suggesting that institutional reforms are also associated both with greater competition faced by the state 
sector and with the elimination of either political rents or soft budgets. 
In contrast, we show that liberalisation decreases the positive productivity differential (if taken in 
percentage) enjoyed by foreign owned firms, as illustrated by Figure 1.  One would expect these firms to be 
at the technology frontier, and operating with reference to international capital and goods markets. We 
investigated this in terms of both foreign ownership per se, and foreign ownership percentage. Higher levels 
of foreign ownership are associated with lower benefits of reform, which again suggests that firms at the 
frontier, with access to international knowledge benefit the least, because of their initial position. 
More general implications of our research are that contrasting the internal and external measures of 
performance is important in order to distinguish between efficiency-enhancing and rent-reducing impact of 
institutional reforms. Following this perspective, we confirm that institutional reforms may produce effects 
that come with opposite sign for productivity and profitability: while the former may be enhanced, that does 
not apply to the latter.  
Moreover, we are able to shed more light on the differential impact of various types of reforms. In 
particular, we find that simple liberalization is sufficient to produce strong productivity effects, and those 
effects are strongest where the initial structures of ownership control are the weakest. Thus, to some extent, 
competition may substitute for ownership reform. This should not come as a surprise: under a genuinely 
competitive system, inefficient ownership forms will either evolve or become eliminated. These results are 
also consistent with the strong link between external liberalisation and growth documented by the meta 
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analysis of Babeckỳ and Campos (2011). However, here we do not account for political economy effects. It 
may also be the case that without ownership reforms, firms and sectors that benefited from weak 
institutional environment most, may have incentives and resources to reverse the reform process. We 
declare this as a limitation of our research; an issue that needs to be explored further. 
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Table 1   
Hypotheses on Ownership and Institutional Factors Affecting Performance 
 
Factors 
Impact on Internal Performance 
(Productivity) 
Impact on External Performance 
(Profitability) 
Ownership 
H1a: FO > DO 
H1b: DO > SO 
Ambiguous 
Institutional reforms H2: Positive Ambiguous 
Institutional reforms: differential 
impact on ownership sectors 
H3a: weakest positive for FO 
H4a: strongest positive for SO 
H3b: FO - negative or weaker 
positive compared with DO 
H4b: SO - negative 
   
Notes:  SO – state-ownership, DO – domestic private ownership, FO – foreign ownership. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Ownership (1998-2006) 
Mean (standard deviation); number of firms with dominant owner in a given category 
Host 
countries 
(1) % FO holding  
 
(2) % SO holding (3) % DO holding   
 
 
Bulgaria 61.87 (36.39); 299 20.69 (29.78); 113 92.78 (20.09); 1,582 
Croatia 74.26 (35.32); 201 39.94 (33.95); 12 95.04 (18.15); 1,046 
Czech Rep. 88.73 (21.88); 591 100 (0.00); 1 95.16 (18.43); 3,646 
Estonia 83.12 (26.95); 461 -- 93.55 (20.02); 1,574 
Hungary 79.62 (30.40); 32 -- 89.89 (26.14); 106 
Lithuania 75.67 (29.39); 116 -- 96.79 (14.37); 1,369 
Latvia 80.99 (29.03); 169 -- 93.54 (20.27); 729 
Poland 86.61 (24.84); 1,589 69.81 (39.01); 270 90.65 (25.05); 5,898 
Romania 81.50 (27.84); 3,840 55.57 (36.78); 31 93.03 (21.45); 13,476 
Russia 74.45 (33.13); 1,204 64.88 (37.8y8); 289 98.18(10.93); 21,354 
Slovakia 82.40 (25.33); 95 -- 48.63 (32.87); 55 
Ukraine 58.00 (32.38); 483 77.09 (34.52); 672 90.71 (23.31); 3,645 
 
Notes:   SO – state-ownership, DO – domestic private ownership, FO – foreign ownership. 
The means represent the dominant shareholder in each ownership category. 
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 Table 3. Determinants of productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Medium size firms -0.288*** -0.287*** -0.287*** -0.287*** -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.286*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large size firms -0.488*** -0.487*** -0.487*** -0.488*** -0.476*** -0.485*** -0.482*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Market share 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State ownership -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.150*** -0.190*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.155*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Foreign ownership 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
High technology dummy 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.384*** 0.381*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP per capita 0.034* 0.037* 0.013 0.034* 0.034* 0.029+ 0.045** 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
GDP growth -0.007+ 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Imports / GDP 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Exports / GDP 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007* -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
EBRD Trade Lib. 0.422*** 
      
 
(0.075) 
      State ownership x Trade Lib. 0.075*** 
      
 
(0.008) 
      Foreign ownership x Trade Lib. -0.002 
      
 
(0.005) 
      Trade Freedom 
 
0.005** 
     
  
(0.002) 
     State ownership x Trade Free 
 
0.003*** 
     
  
(0.001) 
     Foreign ownership x Trade Free 
 
-0.002*** 
     
  
(0.000) 
     Investment Freedom 
  
0.004* 
    
   
(0.002) 
    State ownership x Invest Free 
  
0.001*** 
    
   
(0.000) 
    Foreign ownership x Invest Free 
  
-0.002*** 
    
   
(0.000) 
    EBRD Price Lib. 
   
0.373*** 
   
    
(0.112) 
   State ownership x Price Lib. 
   
0.324*** 
   
    
(0.028) 
   Foreign ownership x Price Lib. 
   
0.031* 
   
    
(0.013) 
   EBRD Entry Lib. 
    
0.053 
  
     
(0.086) 
  State ownership x Entry Lib. 
    
0.103*** 
  
     
(0.013) 
  Foreign ownership x Entry Lib. 
    
-0.107*** 
  
     
(0.005) 
  Business Freedom 
     
-0.004+ 
 
      
(0.002) 
 State ownership x Bus Free 
     
0.006*** 
 
      
(0.001) 
 Foreign ownership x Bus Free 
     
-0.002*** 
 
      
(0.000) 
 Liberalisation scale (EBRD & Econ. Free) 
      
0.122*** 
       
(0.034) 
State ownership x Lib. Scale 
      
0.075*** 
       
(0.007) 
Foreign ownership x Lib. Scale 
      
-0.049*** 
       
(0.003) 
Constant 4.478*** 5.239*** 5.466*** 5.229*** 5.210*** 5.217*** 5.105*** 
 
(0.249) (0.227) (0.256) (0.234) (0.239) (0.233) (0.224) 
sigma_u 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
sigma_e 0.361*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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 Table 4. Determinants of productivity (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Medium size firms -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.285*** -0.286*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large size firms -0.476*** -0.482*** -0.487*** -0.481*** -0.479*** -0.482*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Market share 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1.ownership -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.136*** -0.177*** -0.131*** -0.143*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
2.ownership 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.086*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
High technology dummy 0.382*** 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.383*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP per capita 0.024 0.034* 0.025+ 0.062** 0.025 0.032* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) 
GDP growth -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Imports / GDP -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Exports / GDP -0.003 -0.004 -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
EBRD Finance Index 0.397** 
     
 
(0.132) 
     State ownership x EBRD fin index 0.080*** 
     
 
(0.008) 
     For. ownership x EBRD fin index -0.068*** 
     
 
(0.003) 
     Financial Freedom 
 
-0.003* 
    
  
(0.001) 
    State ownership x Fin Free 
 
0.002*** 
    
  
(0.000) 
    For. ownership x Fin Free 
 
-0.002*** 
    
  
(0.000) 
    EBRD Large Priv. 
  
-0.143* 
   
   
(0.060) 
   State ownership x Priv. 
  
0.095*** 
   
   
(0.015) 
   Foreign ownership x Priv. 
  
-0.046*** 
   
   
(0.005) 
   EBRD Compet. Pol. 
   
-0.158* 
  
    
(0.070) 
  State ownership x Compet. 
   
0.131*** 
  
    
(0.014) 
  Foreign ownership x Compet. 
   
-0.074*** 
  
    
(0.005) 
  EBRD Mean Score 
    
0.483* 
 
     
(0.200) 
 State ownership x EBRD Mean 
    
0.119*** 
 
     
(0.012) 
 Foreign ownership x EBRD Mean 
    
-0.100*** 
 
     
(0.006) 
 Econ. Free. Mean Sc. 
     
0.001 
      
(0.003) 
State owner. x Econ. Free Mean 
     
0.010*** 
      
(0.001) 
For. owner. x  Econ. Free Mean 
     
-0.004*** 
      
(0.000) 
Constant 5.123*** 5.227*** 5.198*** 4.933*** 5.237*** 5.223*** 
 
(0.238) (0.238) (0.236) (0.266) (0.232) (0.235) 
sigma_u 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
sigma_e 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes to Tables 3-4  
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Full set of industry, country and time dummies included. Wooldridge two stage estimator. Multilevel ML estimation 
with country-years effects in the second stage. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
Number of observations: 286, 075. Number of country-year random effects: 110. 
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 Table 5. Determinants of profitability (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Medium size firms -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large size firms -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market share 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.052*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Foreign ownership -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
High technology dummy 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.005* 0.005+ 0.006* 0.006* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP growth 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Imports / GDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001+ 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exports / GDP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
EBRD Trade Lib. 0.019* 
      
 
(0.009) 
      State ownership x Trade Lib. -0.041*** 
      
 
(0.003) 
      Foreign ownership x Trade Lib. -0.024*** 
      
 
(0.002) 
      Trade Freedom 
 
0.001* 
     
  
(0.000) 
     State ownership x Trade Free 
 
-0.001*** 
     
  
(0.000) 
     Foreign ownership x Trade Free 
 
-0.000*** 
     
  
(0.000) 
     Investment Freedom 
  
0.000 
    
   
(0.000) 
    State ownership x Invest Free 
  
-0.001*** 
    
   
(0.000) 
    Foreign ownership x Invest Free 
  
-0.000+ 
    
   
(0.000) 
    EBRD Price Lib. 
   
-0.003 
   
    
(0.014) 
   State ownership x Price Lib. 
   
-0.090*** 
   
    
(0.008) 
   Foreign ownership x Price Lib. 
   
-0.056*** 
   
    
(0.004) 
   EBRD Entry Lib. 
    
-0.006 
  
     
(0.013) 
  State ownership x Entry Lib. 
    
-0.009+ 
  
     
(0.005) 
  Foreign ownership x Entry Lib. 
    
0.037*** 
  
     
(0.002) 
  Business Freedom 
     
-0.001* 
 
      
(0.000) 
 State ownership x Bus Free 
     
-0.002*** 
 
      
(0.000) 
 Foreign ownership x Bus Free 
     
0.000*** 
 
      
(0.000) 
 Liberalisation scale (EBRD & Econ. 
Free) 
      
0.010+ 
       
(0.005) 
State ownership x Lib. Scale 
      
-0.021*** 
       
(0.002) 
Foreign ownership x Lib. Scale 
      
0.001 
       
(0.001) 
Constant 0.173*** 0.193*** 0.211*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 
(0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
sigma_u 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
sigma_e 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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 Table 6. Determinants of profitability (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
Medium size firms -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large size firms -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market share 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.ownership -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.041*** -0.063*** -0.054*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
2.ownership -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
High technology dummy 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.005* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth 0.001 0.000 0.001+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Imports / GDP -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exports / GDP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
EBRD Finance Index 0.008 
     
 
(0.017) 
     State ownership x EBRD fin index -0.034*** 
     
 
(0.003) 
     For. ownership x EBRD fin index 0.008*** 
     
 
(0.001) 
     Financial Freedom 
 
-0.000 
    
  
(0.000) 
    State ownership x Fin Free 
 
-0.001*** 
    
  
(0.000) 
    For. ownership x Fin Free 
 
0.000** 
    
  
(0.000) 
    EBRD Large Priv. 
  
-0.029** 
   
   
(0.009) 
   State ownership x Priv. 
  
-0.021*** 
   
   
(0.006) 
   Foreign ownership x Priv. 
  
0.005* 
   
   
(0.002) 
   EBRD Compet. Pol. 
   
0.003 
  
    
(0.011) 
  State ownership x Compet. 
   
-0.058*** 
  
    
(0.006) 
  Foreign ownership x Compet. 
   
0.014*** 
  
    
(0.002) 
  EBRD Mean Score 
    
-0.006 
 
     
(0.027) 
 State ownership x EBRD Mean 
    
-0.054*** 
 
     
(0.005) 
 Foreign ownership x EBRD Mean 
    
0.006** 
 
     
(0.002) 
 Econ. Free. Mean Sc. 
     
0.000 
      
(0.001) 
State owner. x Econ. Free Mean 
     
-0.003*** 
      
(0.000) 
For. owner. x  Econ. Free Mean 
     
0.001*** 
      
(0.000) 
Constant 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.190*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) 
sigma_u 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
sigma_e 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Notes to Tables 5-6  
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Full set of industry, country and time dummies included. Wooldridge two stage estimator. Multilevel ML estimation 
with country-years effects in the second stage. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
Number of observations: 346,642. Number of country-year random effects: 119. 
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Figure 1. Effects of price liberalization on productivity  
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Figure 2. Effects of trade liberalisation on productivity 
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Figure 3. Effects of price liberalisation on profitability 
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Figure 4. Effects of trade liberalisation on profitability 
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